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INTRODUCTION
Trustees, beware! You may have to finance personally the clean-up
of hazardous waste even though you are not responsible for the con-
tammation. In City of Phoenix v Garbage Services Co.,' the most im-
portant decision regarding trustee liability under CERCLA2 to date,
the district court of Arizona (Arizona court), held a testamentary
trustee personally liable for response costs3 beyond the assets held in
trust. As it now stands, every past and present trustee who has pos-
sessed or possesses power over the utilization of trust property is po-
tentially liable for the cost of hazardous waste clean-up. The Arizona
court's decision has sent shock waves throughout the trustee commu-
nity. With no appeal pending,4 the Arizona court's decision is the
only decision addressing trustee liability under CERCLA.
While the Arizona court allowed the trustee to seek indemnification
from trust assets, if those assets are insufficient the trustee is ulti-
mately responsible for the balance. This is an alarming prospect espe-
cially m light of the fact that CERCLA provides few defenses,5 is
1. 827 F Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1993) [hereinafter Phoenix II].
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended m scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. and 49 U.S.C.).
3. Response costs include the costs of all actions undertaken to clean-up, remove,
mitigate, prevent the release of hazardous substances into the environment. See 42
U.S.C. 9601, §§ 23,24. In an earlier decision, City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co.,
816 F Supp. 564,567 (1993) [hereinafter Phoenix 1], the court held that a trustee is an
"owner" as defined by CERCLA.
4. In a Telephone Interview with Barry Sandier, Esq. of Morrison & Foerster,
attorneys for the defendant, in San Francisco, CA, this author was told that the case
has been settled and is not being appealed (Feb. 14, 1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1986) lists the following defenses:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person
otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages
resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of
the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
(except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a public tariff
and acceptance for a carnage by a common carmer by rail), if the defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consid-
eration the characteristics of such hazardous substances, in light of all rele-
vant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences
that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions; or
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applied retroactively 6 and demands staggering amounts of money for
response costs while insurance is virtually impossible to obtain.7
Prior to the Phoenix I and Phoenix 11 decisions, many commenta-
tors8 speculated as to whether courts would hold trustees liable under
CERCLA. While blind speculation is no longer necessary, one may
now ruminate as to whether the Arizona court decisions are an aber-
ration or precedent other courts will follow. If treated as precedent,
the Arizona court decisions will evoke much fear from trustees
throughout the country. Several commentators offer advice to pro-
spective trustees on how to insulate themselves from CERCLA liabil-
ity, but that advice provides no solace to current or past trustees.9
This Note analyzes the Arizona court's decision to hold trustees
personally liable as "owners" within the meaning of CERCLA. Part I
gives a brief overview of CERCLA. Part II discusses the traditional
common law of trusts and the modem trend in trustee liability. Part
III analyzes the recent cases, Phoenix I and Phoenix 11, focusing on
the court's adoption of the common law of trusts. Part IV presents
the legislative response and Part V concludes by asserting that Phoe-
nix I and Phoenix II were erroneously decided. Future courts should
follow the trust law trend which relieves trustees from personal liabil-
ity when they are without fault. In the alternative, CERCLA should
be amended to exempt trustees from the definition of "owner" when
the trustee is without fault for the contamination.
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
6. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F Supp. 1064, 1075 (D. Colo. 1985); United
States v. Monsanto, Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding CERCLA's
retroactivity consistent with due process), cert. denied, 1095 S. Ct. 3156 (1989).
7 See William L. Hoey, Note, Personal Liability of Trustees Under the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 68 U.
DEr. L. REv 73 n.12 (1993).
8. See Douglas M. Garrou, Note, The Potentially Responsible Trustee: Probable
Target for CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REv 113 (1991); Hoey, supra note 7;
Deborah A. Lawrence, Liability of Trustees under CERCLA, 34 Rus GESTAB 561
(1991); Joel S. Moskowitz, Trustee Liability under CERCLA, 21 EvTrL. L. REP.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,003 (1991); Kurt R. Strasser & Demse Rodosevich, Seeing the For-
est Through the Trees in CERCLA Liability, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 493 (1993); Larry
Schnapf, Lender Liability Rule Doesn't Help Trustees, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 12.
9. See Kevin C. Murphy & Elizabeth C. Yen, Trustee Liability for the Cost of Site
Environmental Cleanup, 110 BANKiN L.. 467 (1993), who recommend the following
precautions:
Evaluate the environmental condition of real property before agreeing to
serve as trustee; ensure that the trust agreement or will permits the trustee
or executor to decline to serve; require the settlor to obtain environmental
impairment insurance that is explicitly transferable to the trustee or execu-
tor; ensure that the trust agreement expressly provides for commitment of
trust estate assets towards environmental cleanup; arrange for indemnifica-
tion by the beneficiary or other party.
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I. CERCLA OVERVIEW
CERCLAI ° was a hastily drafted piece of legislation in response to
congressional concern for the problem of active and inactive hazard-
ous waste sites and hazardous waste spills. In enacting CERCLA,
Congress sought two basic objectives. First, to give the federal gov-
ernment the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to the
environmental problems of national magnitude caused by hazardous
waste disposal." Second, Congress sought to impose fiscal responsi-
bility on appropriate persons for problems caused by the disposal of
hazardous substances.' 2
CERCLA provides the federal and state governments with a com-
prehensive device to remedy the problems of hazardous waste liabil-
ity, compensation and clean-up. Specifically, CERCLA authorizes
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'3 to identify abandoned
hazardous waste sites, use "Superfund"'14 resources to clean-up those
sites and sue any potentially responsible parties (PRP) it can locate
for reimbursement of clean-up costs.' 5
Despite Congress' effort to list PRPs, courts continue to grapple
with congressional intent as to who comprises the nefarious club of
"owners" and "operators" under CERCLA, winch is clouded with
ambiguity. 6 Moreover, the dearth of legislative history provides the
courts with little guidance, which has led one court to comment that
"CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely drafted
provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history."' 7
10. Tis paper includes a brief overview of CERCLA since there is a plethora of
sources already available detailing the legislative history of CERCLA. For a thor-
ough explanation of CERCLA's history, see generally Frank P Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1 (1982).
11. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st
Cir. 1986).
12. Id. at 1080.
13. EPA is the federal agency charged with much of the enforcement of CER-
CLA. See Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 606 n.6.
14. "Superfund" is a fund established to cover cleanup costs for a contamnated
site. Superfund covers cleanup costs if the site has been abandoned, if the responsible
parties elude detection, or if private resources are inadequate. The funds for
Superfund come from taxes collected over a five-year period on petroleum and cer-
tain inorganic chemicals, as well as from general federal revenues. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9631 (1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1041 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. See id. § 9607(1)-(4) for a list of "responsible parties."
16. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990)
citing Coastal Casting Serv. v. Aron, 1988 WL 35012 (S.D. Tex. 1988) ("It is well
known that CERCLA was hastily drafted and adopted, with resulting ambigui-
ties. "); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md.
1986) ("The structure of section 107(a), like so much of this hastily patched together
compromise Act, is not a model of statutory clarity."); see also United States v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F Supp. 823, 838 (W.D Miss. 1984).
17. Dedham Water, 805 F.2d at 1080 (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F
Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985)).
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It is therefore not surprising that courts throughout the country strug-
gle and sometimes stumble in an attempt to decipher the meaning of
CERCLA and who it includes.
Nonetheless, CERCLA purports to hold four groups of "persons' ' 8
strictly liable 9 for government2' and private-party clean-up costs:2 '
any person who is a current "owner" or "operator" of facilities con-
taminated by hazardous substances regardless of whether the pollu-
tion occurred before the current owner owned the property; any
person who owned or operated a facility when hazardous substances
were deposited there whether or not they owned the property at the
time of clean-up; anyone who arranges for disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances; and transporters who carry the hazardous waste
to disposal and treatment facilities are liable under CERCLA. The
problem lies in trying to determine who comes within one of the four
groups. The normal rule of statutory construction is a reading of the
statute itself and the legislative history behind it, if necessary, to clar-
ify any ambiguities. 2 When neither source provides the court with
the necessary insight, however, a judicial method must be developed
to fill the statute's interstices.23
Significantly, courts have been inclined to interpret CERCLA24
broadly and to include corporate officers' and active stockholders
among those on the CERCLA "wanted list."26 On the other hand,
18. The term "person" means an individual, firm, corporation, association, part-
nership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government,
State, mumcipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body. CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
19. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,732
n.3 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that most cases have imposed strict liability under CER-
CLA), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1986) [hereinafter NEPACCO].
20. Government clean-up costs are incurred when the EPA responds to a release
or threat of a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. CERCLA
§ 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1988).
21. For the procedures pnvate parties must follow for private actions under CER-
CLA, see generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs: The
Private Cause of Action Under CERCLA, 13 EcoLoGY L.Q. 181, 196-232 (1986); Pa-
tricia L. Quentel, Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions for Hazardous
Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 139.
22. See generally Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir.
1990).
23. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252,268 n.26 (3d Cir. 1992).
24. Dedham Water, 805 F.2d at 1081 ("We are obligated to construe [CER-
CLA's] provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative pur-
poses."); United States v. Bums, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 WL 242553, at *1 (D.N.H. Sept.
12, 1988) ("The term "owner" like the Act generally, should be construed broadly.")
[hereinafter Burns 1]; United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653
F Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984) (held lessee/sublessee liable as owners under CER-
CLA, stating, "[t]o conclude otherwise would frustrate Congress' intent that persons
with responsibility for hazardous conditions bear the cost of remedying those
conditions").
25. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 742-44.
26. See Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988).
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some courts have construed CERCLA narrowly and have refused to
further expand its scope.27 The holdings rendered in Phoenix I and
Phoenix II, however, further broadened the list of PRPs by including
trustees. Since hazardous substance contamination is considered an
environmental tort,2 resolution of these trust law issues is imperative
before one can analyze the liability of a trustee under CERCLA.
II. THE COMMON LAW OF TRusTEEs: PERSONAL LiABILITY
Trusts are a umque way of passing and holding title to property. A
trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property. The person
who holds the property is subjected to equitable duties to manage it
for the benefit of another person, which arise as a result of a manifes-
tation of intention to create it.29
Trusts can be created in a variety of contexts. For example, trusts
may be created for estate planmng, business arrangements, sales
transactions, debtor-creditor relationships and management of an in-
dividual's assets during his or her life. Trusts can also serve various
purposes such as the conservation of property for beneficiaries. 30 The
three principal players involved in a trust are the settlor,31 trustee32
and beneficiary.33 The trustee and beneficiary each have an interest in
27. Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155,157 (7th Cir.
1988) ("It is not our function to design rules of liability from the ground up A
court's job is to find and enforce stopping points no less than to implement other
legislative choices."); see also Joslyn Mfg Co., 893 F.2d at 83 (holding that without an
express congressional directive to the contrary, common-law principles govern the
court's analysis).
28. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 603.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
30. Some purposes include conservation of property for beneficiaries as a protec-
tion against their own inability to manage (whether due to disability, naivete regard-
ing investments, susceptibility to excessive solicitations or spendthrift propensities), to
avoid guardianship requirements for the receipt of assets by mnors or other incapaci-
tated persons, to mmmnze probate and accompanying transfer costs and, in certain
instances, to minimize taxes. Karen J. Walsh & Fredda L. Cohen, "Overview of
Trusts" Planning for the Elderly Client: Revocable Trusts, Irrevocable Trusts and
Medicaid Trusts, N.Y.S.T.B.A., at 19 (Oct. 20, 1992) [hereinafter Overview].
31. The settlor is the grantor or donor in a deed of settlement who creates the
trust. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 3(1). The person who brings a trust into exist-
ence is known as either the "settlor, .... grantor, .... donor" or "trustor." Overview,
supra note 30, at 19.
32. A trustee is a person holding property m trust. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29,
§ 3(3). The person or entity who is acting as the manager of the trust is known as the
"trustee." The trustee has legal title to the trust assets and manages those assets in a
fiduciary capacity. There may be more than one trustee for a trust, if the trust instru-
ment so provides. Overview, supra note 30, at 20.
33. The beneficiary is the person for whose benefit property is held in trust. RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 29, § 3(4). The beneficiary can be an individual or a group of
individuals or entities. The beneficiary has the right to receive some benefit from the
trust property. The rights of the individuals or entities may vary as to income rights or
principle distributions, or combinations of both. Such rights may be absolute or con-
tingent on some circumstance (e.g., survival of income beneficiary) and they may be
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the trust property, but the trustee holds only the legal interest while
the beneficiary holds the equitable interest.34
The only way to perfect a trust is by the settlor passing title of the
property to the trustee by delivery of the trust subject matter of an
instrument of transfer.35 However, while the trustee holds legal title
she has no economic interest in the trust enterprise and carries out her
duties solely for the benefit of the beneficiary who is entitled to the
entire economic interest in the trust enterprise.36 The manner m
which the trust is to be managed is set forth in the trust instrument.37
The trust instrument generally grants the trustee broad powers to
manage the trust property.
Many types of trusts can be created. Testamentary trusts (which are
relevant to this discussion) are created under a testator's will and take
effect when the testator dies, after the letters of trusteeship are
granted and the will has been admitted to probate.38 The trust may be
changed until the testator's death, when it becomes irrevocable.39
A. Liability of Trustees4'
The Restatement explains that a trustee is a person in a fiduciary
relationship to the beneficiary and is under a duty to act for the bene-
fit of the beneficiary as to matters within the scope of the relation-
ship.41 Trustees may incur liability to third persons for torts
committed in the course of administration of the trust42 or simply by
mandatory or discretionary with the trustee, according to the terms of the trust mstru-
ment. Overview, supra note 30, at 20.
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 2f.
35. 3A AusTIN W ScoTT & WILLIAM F FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 265
(4th ed. 1988) [hereinafter 3A SCOTT]; 1 AusTiN W Scorr AND WILLIAM F
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.6 (4th ed. 1987) (a trust exists only where title
to property is held by one person for the benefit of another) [hereinafter 1 Scor].
36. Harlan F Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and
Torts of the Trustee, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 527 (1922).
37 Generally, a trust is created by a written instrument (but not always) which
contains the terms and conditions of the trust. Such trust documents are often re-
ferred to as the "trust agreement" or "trust indenture." Overview, supra note 30, at
20. The typical powers a state bestows upon a trustee are found m the Uniform Trust-
ees' Powers Act (which can be found within the UNIF. PROB. CODE, U.L.A. § 2-101
(1983)).
38. Overview, supra note 30, at 20. There are many other types of trusts, but for
purposes of this Note, only testamentary trusts are explained since this was the type of
trust at issue in Phoenix I and Phoenix IL
39. Overview, supra note 30, at 20-21.
40. The question of trustee liability by virtue of "ownership" and "power" is the
precise issue dealt with in Phoenix I and Phoenix II.
41. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 2.
42. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 264, provides:
The trustee is subject to personal liability to third persons for torts commit-
ted in the course of the administration of the trust to the same extent that he
would be liable if he held the property free of trust.
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virtue of holding title to the trust property.43 As the esteemed Harlan
Fiske Stone explained, the rationale behind this general rule is that
"the economic enterprise should carry the burdens of loss occasioned
by the tortious acts of those engaged in it."44 The beneficiary who is
dispossessed of legal title, however, is not subject to the liabilities of
third persons that are imposed upon the holder of legal title.45
It is important to distinguish between a trustee who is held liable as
a fiduciary of the trust and a trustee who is held liable personally 46
When a trustee acts in her fiduciary capacity, she acts in a representa-
tive capacity with respect to property in which others own the benefi-
cial interest. In contrast, a fiduciary, in her personal capacity, acts
with respect to her own property. Accordingly, a claim brought
against a trustee in her personal capacity is one against the trustee's
own money, while a claim against the trustee in her fiduciary capacity
is a claim against the trust's money.47
Because a trust is not a person, it is incapable of committing a tort
or being liable for any tort.48 Thus, the victim of a tortious act must
sue the trustee. If found liable in tort, the trustee must pay the dam-
ages out of her personal assets.49 If personally without fault for the
tortious act, however, the trustee may seek indemnification from the
trust.50
Indemnification, however, will fail to compensate the trustee when
trust assets are insufficient. This is a questionable result, inasmuch as
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 265, provides:
Where a liability to third person is imposed upon a person, not as a result of
a contract made by hun or a tort committed by him but because he is the
holder of the title to property, a trustee as holder of the title to the trust
property is subject to personal liability, but only to the extent to which the
trust estate is sufficient to indemnify him.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 265 cmt. a, reads in part:
a. Scope of the rule Where, however, the trustee is liable only as
holder of the title to the trust property, and where, without fault on the part
of the trustee, the trust estate is insufficient to indemnify him, he is liable
only to the extent to which the trust estate is sufficient to indemnify hun
The modem trend has been to hold the trustee as holder of the title to the
trust property liable to third persons only as trustee, that is only to the extent
to which the trust estate is sufficient to indemnify hun.
44. Stone, supra note 36, at 529.
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 277 cmt. a.
46. The following discussion of trustee liability in a fiduciary capacity and a per-
sonal capacity is adapted from Michael L. Graham & Philip Lindquist, City of Phoe-
nix Case Lays Sound Foundation for the Environmental Liability of Fiduciaries, 8
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 2, 46 (1993) [hereinafter Sound Foundation].
47. Id.
48. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUsTEES § 732 (rev. 2d ed. 1982).
49. See Stone, supra note 36, at 527 ("[The trustee is] personally liable for the torts
committed by him or his employees in carrying out the trust. ").
50. See id. ("[The trustee] may appropriate from the assets of the trust such
amount as is required to indemnify him, unless his act in incurring the liability . [is
a] violation of his duties as trustee. ").
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the trustee derives no economic benefit from the trust except for a
nominal trustee fee. The inequity of holding a trustee personally lia-
ble for a tort for which she is not personally at fault has led to the
modem trend away from holding trustees personally liable.5 '
If a trustee acts for the benefit of the trust, one can proffer a strong
argument that the trustee should be relieved of personal liability be-
cause any liabilities incurred by the trustee are m furtherance of an
enterprise in which the trustee has no economic interest. If without
personal fault, a trustee should have the right of exoneration from
liability, not just indemnification for payments she actually makes.52
Such exoneration, however, is limited to situations where the trustee
acted in good faith and actually benefitted the trust.53
While traditionally courts held trustees personally liable for torts
committed during the admmstration of the estate, modem statutes do
not. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) explicitly relieves trustees of
personal liability when the trustee is not personally at fault for the
tortious act.54 Most states have adopted the relief afforded trustees by
the UPC." "The purpose of this [relief] is to make the liability of the
trust and trustee the same as that of the decedent's estate and per-
sonal representative."5 6 Since the Arizona court embraced traditional
trust law instead of following the modem trend, the principles of the
traditional law must be examined.
51. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 7-306 (1989).
52. See generally Austin W Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of
Trusts, 28 HARV. L. REv 725 (1915) [hereinafter Liabilities].
53. Id. at 735.
54. UNiF PROB. CODE § 7-306 addresses personal liability of the trustee to third
parties. The section reads in its entirety:
(a) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not personally
liable on contracts properly entered into m his fiduciary capacity m the
course of administration of the trust estate unless he fails to reveal his repre-
sentative capacity and identify the trust estate in the contract.
(b) A trustee is personally liable for obligations ansing from ownership or
control of property of the trust estate or for torts committed in the course of
adminstration of the trust estate only if he is personally at fault.
(c) Claims based on contracts entered into by a trustee in his fiduciary ca-
pacity, on obligations arising from ownership or control of the trust estate,
or on torts committed m the course of trust administration may be asserted
against the trust estate by proceeding against the trustee in his fiduciary ca-
pacity, whether or not the trustee is personally liable therefor.
(d) The question of liability as between the trust estate and the trustee mdi-
vidually may be determined m a proceeding for accounting, surcharge or
indemnification or other appropriate proceeding.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 7-306 (1989).
55. See Sound Foundation, supra note 46, at 66 ("[S]ection 7-306, or comparable
language, has been adopted in thirty-two states, including Califorma and New York,
which are generally regarded as the bellwether states for purposes of fiduciary law.").
56. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 7-306 cmt. (1989).
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B. Liability in the Course of Administration of the Trust
Traditional trust law holds trustees personally liable for torts com-
mitted in the course of the administration 57 of the trust and "for inju-
ries resulting from the condition of the trust premises."5 8 According
to section 264 of the Restatement, the trustee's personal liability for a
tort committed during the administration of the trust is the same lia-
bility she would bear if she held the property free of trust. In other
words, liability attaches as if the property were her own. For example,
under this section, a trustee would be liable for a personal injury ars-
Ing from some defect in or on the trust property.5 9 However, if the
trustee discharged a liability incurred during the proper administra-
tion of the trust, she ordinarily has a right to be reimbursed by the
trust.60 But if the trustee was not authorized to incur the liability, she
has no right to reimbursement.61
C. Liability of Trustee as Title Holder
Section 265 of the Restatement sets forth another way in which a
trustee may incur liability under traditional common law: simply by
holding title to the property Examples of trustee liability arising by
virtue of holding title to the property include property taxes, share-
holder assessments62 and liabilities arising from covenants that run
with the land. If liability attaches to the trustee because she is the
holder of title to property, she is subject to personal liability, but only
to the extent the trust estate is sufficient to indenmify her.63
III. CITY OF PHOENIX V. GARBAGE SERVICES COMPANY
In two separate decisions, the Arizona court decided the issue of
trustee liability under CERCLA. In the first decision, Phoenix I, the
court held that a trustee is an owner within the CERCLA definition.
In the second, Phoenix II, the court decided that as an owner, a
trustee may be personally liable for response costs regardless of the
trust's ability to indemnify him.'
The court synthesized CERCLA liability principles with those of
the common law of trusts to develop a "new" standard by which to
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 264.
58. Liabilities, supra note 52, at 726.
59. See Cook v. Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Marion v.
Chandler, 81 S.E.2d 89, 93-95 (W Va. 1954).
60. Liabilities, supra note 52, at 727
61. Id.
62. RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 265 cmrts. b, c.
63. Id. § 265.
64. The trustee in the Phoenix I and Phoenix 1I decisions will be referred to by
masculine pronouns to avoid confusion since the court referred to Valley National
Bank [hereinafter VNB] using the masculine pronouns. Feminine pronouns are used
in this Note when discussing trustees in general.
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judge the liability of a trustee under CERCLA. This new standard
focuses on whether there is sufficient evidence from which to infer the
trustee's "power to control" the use of trust property and whether she
"knowingly" allowed the property to be used for the disposal of haz-
ardous substances. 65 According to the court, those elements, when
fused with CERCLA's definition of "owner," render a trustee person-
ally liable for response costs.
Phoenix I is the most recently published decision addressing the is-
sue of trustee liability under CERCLA. The City of Phoenix (City)66
brought an action under CERCLA against defendant, VNB,67 seeking
to recover response costs that the City incurred m cleamng up a con-
taninated site.68 The City alleged that the hazardous substances were
deposited when the landfill was an asset of the settlor estate. VNB,
however, argued that it was not an "owner" under CERCLA and
therefore not a PRP 69
The settlor, Wilbur Calvin Estes (Estes) owned a landfill site. In
1965, Estes sold the landfill but retained an option to repurchase it.
Estes died later that year. His will nominated VNB as executor, and
VNB agreed to assume that role. The will also provided for a testa-
mentary trust and conveyed the balance of Estes' property, including
the option to purchase the landfill, to VNB as trustee.
VNB exercised the purchase option on the landfill in 1966. At the
time of purchase, Garbage Services Company (GSC) was managing
the property 70 Estes had been the president of GSC and owned 100
percent of its stock. VNB now held this stock as an asset of the trust
formed by Estes' will.71
65. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 607.
66. In an initial decision, City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co., 33 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1655 (D. Ariz. 1991), "the court held that, under the then existing posture
of the case, no liability attached to [VNB]. solely by virtue of the warranty deed
conveying the landfill to the bank, as trustee, but that a question of material fact
existed as to whether the bank bore the necessary indicia of CERCLA ownership m
either its capacity as executor or trustee." See Kevin C. Murphy & Elizabeth C. Yen,
Court Limits the Potential of Trustee Liability for the Cost of Site Environmental
Cleanup, 111 BANKING L.J. 89, 90 (1994).
67. Several Anmcus Curiae briefs were submitted on behalf of VNB: John Gill,
Michael F Crotty and Thomas J. Greco, American Bankers Ass'n, Washington D.C.,
on brief for amicus curiae American Bankers Ass'n; Michael L. Graham & Philip M.
Lindquist, Baker & Botts, Dallas, TX, on brief for ancus curiae National Trust Real
Estate Ass'n; G. Van Velsor Wolf, Jr. and Martha E. Gibbs, Snell & Wiliner, Phoenix,
AZ, on brief for amicus curiae Arizona Bankers Ass'n; Theodore V.H. Mayer,
Hughes Hubbard & Reed, New York City, on brief for amici curiae lBJ Schroeder
Bank and Trust Co., The Northern States Trust Co., and U.S. Trust Co. of New York.
Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 601.
68. Phoenix I, 816 F Supp. at 565-66.
69. Id. at 566.
70. Id.
71. Phoenix 11, 827 F Supp. at 602.
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VNB continued to lease the site to GSC, which managed and ad-
ministrated the landfill until 1972 when the landfill was closed. 2 Dur-
ing the six years GSC managed the site for VNB, VNB paid the
property taxes on the site and obtained liability insurance for the land-
fill. In 1980, the City initiated condemnation proceedings by which it
acquired the entire landfill (the City had acquired parts of the landfill
earlier). After the City incurred clean-up costs at the site, it filed an
action against the trustee for reimbursement.73
VNB moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that
VNB was not an "owner" or "operator" of the landfill and was there-
fore not a responsible party under CERCLA.7 4 The City responded
by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same issue.75 In
denying VNB's motion and granting the City's cross-motion, the court
reasoned that while VNB did not qualify as an "operator," VNB was
liable as an "owner.
76
In Phoenix II, VNB moved for partial summary judgment, to limit
its liability to the amount of assets held in trust.77 This motion was
also demed78 and VNB was held personally liable, beyond the trust's
ability to mdemnify 7 9 The court held that any trustee who possesses
"power to control" the use of the property and "knowingly" allows
property to be used for hazardous substance disposal, is subject to
personal liability."0
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PHOENIX DECISIONS
A. Trustee as Operator
In Phoenix I, the court first analyzed a trustee's status as a potential
"operator." The City argued that since VNB's status as a trustee gave
VNB "authority to control" the landfill, VNB should be held liable for
response costs as an "operator.""1 The court rejected the City's "op-
erator" argument and explained that VNB was not involved in the
day-to-day adnmnistration of the landfill and therefore did not qualify
as an "operator. '8 2
Prior to Phoenix I, courts had defined "operator" not as one who
had actual control over operations, but rather as one who possesses
mere "authority to control" the operations and decisions relating to




76. Id. at 568 ("This court holds that a trustee is an 'owner' for the purposes of
Section 107 of CERCLA, even though the trustee may hold only bare legal title.").
77. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 601.
78. Id. at 607.
79. Id. at 606-607.
80. Id. at 606.
81. Phoenix 1, 816 F Supp. at 567.
82. Id.
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the disposal of hazardous substances at the site. 3 The Arizona court
purported to adopt the definition of "operator" previously set forth by
other courts.' Apparently, however, it was precisely VNB's lack of
authority to control the day-to-day management and admimstration of
the facility which discouraged the court from holding VNB responsi-
ble as an "operator." 5 Since operational matters were handled en-
tirely by GSC, VNB could not, said the court, be held liable as an
"operator. '8 6
The Arizona court's "operator" analysis, however, is flawed. In-
stead of analyzing whether VNB could have exercised control if it
chose to do so, the court focused on what VNB actually did and did
not do. If that is the analysis the court intended to adopt, a better way
to describe the "Arizona operator standard" would be to state that a
trustee must "actually have exercised control" over the day-to-day
management and admimstration, in order to be held liable as an "op-
erator" under CERCLA.
On the contrary, if the court intended to follow the precedents it
cited,87 then inquiry should have been made into whether or not VNB,
as owner, had the authority to control the day-to-day details of opera-
tion.88 Since the court neglected to make such an inquiry, the court
did not adhere to earlier definitions of "operator." Nonetheless, the
court did not hold VNB liable as an "operator" but rather as an
"owner," so examination of the analysis shifts to trustee liability as an
"owner."
83. This is the definition of "operator" that most courts have adopted. See Nurad,
Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992); Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992)
(relying on Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988)); Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d at
157-158; CPC Int'l Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp, 731 F Supp. 783, 788 (W.D. Mich.
1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F Supp. 665, 671-72 (D. Idaho 1986).
84. Apparently, the Arizona court read Kaiser Aluminum, 976 F.2d at 1341, as
meaning "actual control." The Kaiser court held that "operator" liability under CER-
CLA attaches only if the defendant had the "authority to control" the cause of the
contamination at the time the hazardous substances are released into the environment.
85. Phoenix I, 816 F Supp. at 567 (The Arizona court based its conclusion on the
following facts: "VNB did not enter into or negotiate contracts for the disposal of
wastes at the landfill VNB did not know the identity or the nature of GSC's
customers. VNB's communication with GSC's personnel was limited to matters in-
volving Estes' estate, such as tax questions, and not the operation of the landfill.").
86. Id.
87. The Arizona court cites cases in support of its conclusion which are in stark
contrast to the position taken by the Arizona court. See generally Nurad, 966 F.2d 837
(4th Cir. 1992) and Hines Lumber, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
88. For support of this argument, see Kim Maree Johannessen, Special Liability
Issues and Caselaw Update Under Superfund, C851 ALI-ABA 303, 313 (Aug. 18,
1993) ("While the Phoenix court did not reject the Kaiser Aluminum decision out-
right, it read it as requiring actual control over the operation of the facility.").
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B. Trustee as Owner
Phoenix I stands for the proposition that trustees as holders of legal
title are liable as "owners" under CERCLA.89 That concept was first
considered by the district court of New Hampshire in Burns 1,90 where
the court discussed the potential liability of trustees as "owners" of
the property.91
Burns I was a civil action under CERCLA against William Burns
and others for response costs incurred in a clean-up of hazardous sub-
stances. The Gonic Realty Trust (Gomc) had acquired ownership of a
certain industrial mill complex. Gomc had been established by Harry
Freidberg and Raymond Crowley for the benefit of Gonic Realty As-
sociates, a partnership formed by Freidberg and Crowley, the co-
trustees.92
During Gomc's ownership of the mill, Gonic hired a managing
agent who leased portions of the mill to various tenants for business
and manufacturing activities. One or more of these tenants left haz-
ardous substances behind which contaminated the property Crowley,
as the sole trustee, directed the managing agent to contact EPA who
determined that the hazardous substances had to be removed. EPA
proceeded to "clean-up" and subsequently commenced an action for
response costs.
Crowley moved to dismiss, asserting that he never owned the land
and that he never personally participated in conduct that violated
CERCLA.93 The court rejected the argument and demed the motion.
The court held that Crowley, as trustee, held legal title to the trust
property and under trust law could be liable for obligations as the
owner of the property.94
Subsequently, the New Hampshire district court ruled on the merits
and applied New Hampshire partnership law in Burns 11.9 Under
New Hampshire partnership law, a partner may incur unlimited per-
sonal liability Gomc was a partnership governed by a trust agree-
89. Phoenix I, 816 F Supp. at 568.
90. See Burns 1, 1988 WL 242553.
91. Id. at *2 (" as trustee, Crowley held legal title to the trust property and
under trust law could be liable for obligations as the owner of the property.").
92. United States v. Bums, No. 88-094-S, slip op. at 2 (D.N.H. Aug. 9, 1990)
("Gome Realty Trust was [eventually] dissolved and its assets were distributed to its
partners . Freidberg transferred his beneficial interest m Gomc to Gracia Crowley
for valuable consideration.") [hereinafter Burns I1].
93. Burns 1, 1988 WL 242553 at *1.
94. The court cited RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, §§ 265 and 265.1 and 3A Scorr,
supra note 35.
Graham and Lindquist argue that §§ 265 and 265.1 did not support the court's rul-
ing. "It is ironic that the Burns I court relied on §§ 265 and 265.1 which do not
support the court's ruling, when the court could have relied on § 277.1 which
readily supports the court's refusal to dismiss Crowley as a party." Sound Foundation,
supra note 46, at 9-10.
95. See Burns II, No. 88-094-S.
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ment which subjected Crowley as a partner to unlimited liability.
Crowley's status as a trustee was irrelevant in the court's determma-
tion of liability. The Arizona court, however, relied on Burns I as
authority for imposing liability on a trustee as an owner. As ex-
plained, the Burns 11 court based its holding on partnership law-not
trust law, thus the Arizona court's reliance was misguided. 6
In another attempt to buttress its decision, the Arizona court in-
voked Lone Star Industries v. Horman Family Trusts.9' Based on
Lone Star, the Phoenix I court stated that "[t]he EPA's practice seem-
ingly is to argue that trustees are 'owners' within the meaning of
CERCLA."98 No text in Lone Star indicates that EPA issued a formal
notice to the Lone Star trustee as an "owner." 99 While EPA did issue
a formal notice to the trustee, among others, as notification that each
was a PRP, there is no text in that decision that says EPA issued the
notice to the trustee as "owner." Lone Star, however, alleged that "by
accepting the waste CKD the Hormans and the Williamsens became
the 'owners' thereof and 'accepted responsibility' therefore . ."100 It
is not surprising that Lone Star, as plaintiff, would make such an as-
sertion, but the fact remains that it was not EPA who made the asser-
tion and the court's reliance on that misstatement of fact is again,
misguided and unpersuasive.
The Arizona court found additional support in the legislative intent
behind CERCLA. As an indication that Congress intended "owner"
to have broad application, the court cited a House Report which
96. Graham & Lindquist in their Amicus brief point out that "the Burns I court's
misunderstanding of Scott on Trusts did not result m that court's imposing CERCLA
"owner" liability on the trustee in his personal capacity as a consequence of his own-
ership of contaminated property in his fiduciary capacity." Brief at 10 (emphasis in
the original). See also Burns II, No. 88-094-S, at 8; In re Gonic Realty Trust, 50 B.R.
710, 711 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985)).
Furthermore, the Arizona court misstated that the Burns I court could have disre-
garded the trust because Crowley was the sole trustee and beneficiary. Crowley was
never the sole beneficiary of the Gonic Realty Trust. At all times, Crowley directly or
indirectly owned only one-half of the trust's beneficial interests. Hence, the Arizona
court's advancement of the precedential value of Bums I is unpersuasive.
97 960 F.2d 917.(10th Cir. 1992). The only issue before the court in Lone Star, on
appeal, was whether the amended complaint was sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6)
motion. Its relevance to the Phoenix 1 issue was the fact that the underlying com-
plaint involved an action to recover response costs from the trustee.
98. Phoenix I, 816 F Supp. at 568.
99. The court cites Lone Star, 960 F.2d at 921. The only reference to EPA's formal
notice to the defendants is the following:
From paragraph 16 we learn that the Environmental Protection Agency on
July 26, 1989, issued a formal notice to Lone Star, the Hormans and the
Williamsens, advising all three that each was a "potentially responsible
party" under CERCLA and, as such, each was potentially liable for response
costs incurred in connection with remedial action at the site.
Id. In the above referenced excerpt from Lone Star EPA does not specifically refer to




states that" '[o]wner' is defined to include not only those persons who
hold title to a... facility, but those who, in the absence of holding
title, possess some equivalent indicia of ownership."''1 The court also
pointed out that only one exception to titleholder liability is found in
CERCLA which only "exempts lenders who hold 'indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect [their] security interest.' ,,o While not dis-
positive that Congress intended to include trustees as owners, the
congressional intent analysis the court used is more persuasive than
prior analysis in the decision. Mostly, the Phoenix I decision offered
unpersuasive reasoning. A future court should have little trouble de-
viating from the Phoenix I holding by employing more cogent
analysis.
For example, courts faced with issues regarding bankruptcy trustee
liability under CERCLA have reached different conclusions. One
court refused to hold a bankruptcy trustee liable as an "owner," stat-
ing that "[i]t is the estate itself and not the [bankruptcy] trustee which
is the owner .... ."0 3 In another case, a state court found that since a
trustee did not act outside the scope of his authority in violating the
state's environmental laws, the trustee could not be subjected to per-
sonal liability." 4 Although those cases dealt with bankruptcy trustees,
they offer an alternate method of reasoning for future courts faced
with trustee liability. Should a future court find a trustee personally
liable, however, analysis will shift to an exploration of the extent of
trustee liability.
C. Personal Liability Imposed on Trustees Under CERCLA
In Phoenix II, a court squarely addressed for the first time the extent
of a trustee's liability under CERCLA. To reach its conclusion, the
court attempted to synthesize CERCLA liability principles with trust
common law. That synthesis was incorporated into a uniform federal
common law which holds the trustee personally liable in certain cases.
In fashioning its uniform federal common law, the Arizona court
first explained that nothing in the statute or its legislative history deals
with the issue of trustee liability.105 The Arizona court agreed with
the Tlurd Circuit that CERCLA's meager legislative history and lack
of case law dealing with trustee liability indicated that "Congress ex-
101. Phoenix 1, 816 F Supp. at 567 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 36, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6160, 6181).
102. Id. at 568 (alteration in the original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)).
103. In re T.P Long Chem., Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
104. Wisconsin v. Better Brite Plating, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 574 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1992);
see also In re Sundance Corp., Inc. 149 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993) (non-
liability of a court appointed receiver).
105. Phoenix , 827 F. Supp. at 602.
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pected the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the
statute."'10
6
The court balanced the federal objectives of CERCLA with com-
mercial relationships predicated on state law.' 07 Following the Ninth
Circuit lead, 08 the court purported to structure the uniform federal
common law based on the common law of trusts. The court adopted
the Restatement as a fair representation of common law because
"[t]he law governing trustee liability is well settled, and is nearly uni-
form throughout all jurisdictions."'10 9 The court, however, ignored the
modern trend in trust law adopted by most states." 0
VNB argued that the court should adopt Restatement section 265
as the uniform federal law for trustee liability which would only hold
trustees liable to the extent of the assets held in trust."' Since VNB
did not contaminate the property, and therefore was not at fault, VNB
argued that as title holder it should be held liable only to the extent of
the amount of assets held in trust.1 2 The court disagreed, and re-
sponded that CERCLA addresses a type of environmental tort which
is not committed simply by virtue of holding title, but rather addresses
a tort that is committed during the administration of the trust. Thus,
Restatement section 264 is triggered, not section 265.13
Next, the court differentiated between CERCLA sections 107(a)(1)
and 107(a)(2).1 4 The court agreed with VNB that under Section
107(a)(1), liability is umposed on current owners because of the mere
106. Id. citing Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir.
1990) (quoting Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91
(3d Cir. 1988)) (9th Cir. 1990).
107 Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 602-03 (adopting the balancing test set forth in
United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979)).
108. Louisitana-Pacific Corp., 909 F.2d 1260 ((9th Cir. 1990).
109. Phoenix 11, 827 F Supp. at 603. The City, VNB and amici all agreed, accord-
mg to the court, that the RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, best represented the common
law on issues of trustee liability in most jurisdictions.
110. Since most states have adopted the UPC provision relieving trustees of per-
sonal liability absent personal fault, the court should have incorporated this modem
trend into the uniform federal common law. The Restatement sections adopted by the
court were last updated in 1957, whereas the statutory law relieving trustees of per-
sonal liability is what the states have chosen to adopt more recently.
The statutory law exculpates trustees from personal liability when they are without
fault. This approach is sensible, especially m light of the fact that a trustee receives
little benefit from her position, but for a "nominal" fee received.
111. Phoenix 11, 827 F Supp. at 603.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 603-04 ("Liability does not anse from the mere fact of property owner-
ship, but from the fact that property one owns (or previously owned) presents a po-
tential environmental hazard. Environmental hazards do not just happen, as VNB
and amici suggest; rather, somebody at some time used the property for the disposal
of hazardous substances.").
114. Id. at 604 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(1)-(2)). The statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(1)-(2) reads as follows:
(a) Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate;
"comparable maturity" date.
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fact of property ownership, regardless of when or how the property
became contaminated, and that under traditional common law princi-
ples, the trustee's liability would be limited to the amount of the assets
held in trust."' The court stated that liability under this subsection "is
based on Congress' judgment that among innocent parties, the current
owner of contaminated property should bear at least part of the bur-
den of environmental clean up."" 6
In contrast, the Arizona court found that section 107(a)(2) imposed
liability on current and past owners, provided that they owned the site
at the time of disposal of the hazardous substances." 7 The Arizona
court interpreted the difference between sections 107(a)(1) and
107(a)(2) as that between the current property owner, who was not
the owner at the time of disposal, and the current or past owner who
was the owner at the time of disposal."'
Following its interpretation of sections 107(a)(1) and (a)(2), the
court stated that by enacting CERCLA, Congress codified the com-
mon law rule of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities, and classi-
fied the disposal of hazardous substances as an ultrahazardous
activity. According to the court (which did not cite any authority),
under section 107(a)(2), an owner is strictly liable in Ins personal ca-
pacity for the disposal of hazardous substances, but an owner under
section 107(a)(1) is strictly liable only in his representative capacity." 9
Since the trustee had both the power and the responsibility to control
the use of the property, the court reasoned, the owner should be per-
sonally responsible under section 107(a)(2). 20
In applying the above analysis to trustees, the court explained that
if the trustee had the power to determine how the trust property
would be used, section 107(a)(2) would impose strict personal liability
on the trustee.' 2 ' Accordingly, the court held that under section
107(a)(2) an "owner" is strictly liable for response costs when the
owner possesses power over the use of the property and has the re-
sponsibility to control the use of the property.' 2
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth m subsection (b) of this section:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of.





120. Id. ("Liability under this subsection is not based on mere ownership of prop-
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The court noted, however, that section 107(a)(2) does not apply to
trustees in instances where the trust instrument strips the trustee of
the power to control the use of the property 123 Furthermore, section
107(a)(2) does not apply to trustees when the terms of the trust give a
third person the exclusive power to control the actions of the trustee
with respect to the use of the property.' 24
To help clarify its holding, the court offered an illustration. If, for
example, a trustee has control over the trust property, and knowingly
allows it to be used for the disposal of hazardous substances, then it is
the trustee who is responsible for the decision to use the property for
an ultrahazardous activity." s According to the court, a trustee is not
liable merely because he held title to the property, but because it was
in his power to control the use of the property, and in exercising that
power he chose to allow it be used it for the disposal of hazardous
substances. 26
The Arizona court explained that in VNB's case the trustee chose
to use the property as a landfill. Since that choice resulted in the con-
tamination of the property, under section 107(a)(2), the trustee must
be held liable for response costs.' 27 Moreover, since the trustee's de-
cision was made in the course of admimstration of the trust the court
held the trustee personally liable regardless of the trust's inability to
indemnify hun.' 2s The court relied entirely on the text of the Restate-
ment section 264, without citing any case law in support of its conclu-
sion.129 VNB and amici argued that the Arizona court should have
adopted the holdings of three Illinois federal courts which held that
123. Id.
124. Id. ("In such cases, the trustee's sole duty is to abide by the third person's
wishes, provided they do not violate the terms of the trust."); see RESTATEMENT,
supra note 29, § 185.
125. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 605.
126. Id.
127. Id. ("The trustee is not liable merely because he held title to the property, but
because it was m his power to control the use of the property, and he opted to use it
for the disposal of hazardous substances. Although the trustee's status as the holder
of legal title is the vehicle by which subsection 107(a)(2) imposes liability, there would
not be any liability but for the trustee's decision.").
128. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 264.)
129. Courts have been reluctant to hold trustees personally liable absent fault even
before the statutory changes. See Shnners Hosps. for Crippled Children v. Gardiner,
152 Ariz. 527 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (en banc) (court refused to hold trustee personally
liable absent a breach of trust); Matter of Heizer Corp. v. Hackbarth, 1988 WL 58272
(Del. Ch. June 6, 1988) (absent gross negligence, the trustee is not personally liable
for any error of judgment made m good faith); Sisters of Mercy Health Corp. v. First
Bank of Whiting, 624 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (according to Indiana statute a
trustee is personally liable when injury results because of the trustee's personal act or
omission); Cook v. Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. App. 1978) (trustee was found liable
but the court notes that section 7-306 of the Uniform Probate Code was enacted after
the date of the accident and that neither party cited that section).
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trustees are not "owners" under CERCLA. 30 In all three cases, the
Illinois courts refused to hold that "bare legal title" constitutes "own-
ership" for purposes of CERCLA. 31
Under the terms of an Illinois land trust, a trustee is powerless and
the beneficiary retains the power to direct or control the trustee in
dealing with the title, and also has exclusive control of the manage-
ment, operation, renting and selling of the trust property.1 32 The Illi-
nois courts reasoned that since the trustee was powerless over
decisions concerning the property held in trust, the trustee could not
be considered an "owner." Since VNB possessed power to control the
property (unlike Illinois land trustees), the Arizona court reasoned
that VNB is liable under CERCLA. The Arizona court explained that
it accepted the Illinois courts' holdings because the trustees in those
cases were powerless trustees, but it rejected the Illinois courts' re-
fusal to recognize trustees as "owners."
While trustees are powerless in Illinois and not in Arizona, the
courts, nonetheless, differ on the fundamental point of whether a
trustee is an "owner" or not. Regardless, the Arizona court found
trustees are "owners" for purposes of CERCLA and chose to concen-
trate on a trustee's power to control the property. Apparently, that
power to control the property was the pivotal factor in the Arizona
court's decision. Still, the court had to incorporate trust law principles
into its holding and synthesize the two fields of law.
D. Synthesis of Trust Law and CERCLA
The court set forth three general rules for trustee liability under
CERCLA. 33 First, where a trustee is held liable under section
107(a)(1) as the current owner of contaminated property, the trustee's
liability is limited to the extent that the trust assets are sufficient to
indemnify him. This means that if a trust acquires property that is
already contaminated, the trustee is liable as an "owner," but only to
the extent of the assets held M trust.134
Second, where a trustee is held liable under section 107(a)(2), but
did not have the power to control the use of trust property, the
130. United States v. N.L. Indus., 1992 WL 359986, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 1992)
("It is inconsistent to exempt [secured parties] while holding liable a bank which
merely adrmisters the title for a nominal yearly fee."); Premium Plastics, Inc. v. La
Salle Nat'l Bank, 1992 WL 309561, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 1992) ("[T]is court will
not subject an innocent party such as [the trustee] to liability m order to assure that
plaintiffs have a source of recovery. .. "). In re Petersen Sand and Gravel Inc., 806 F
Supp. 1346, 1359 (N.D. III. 1992) ("Recogmzing that trustee liability does not serve
the legislative ends of CERCLA, the EPA does not consider trustees liable.").
131. Id.
132. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 605 (citing N.L. Indus., 1992 WL 359986 at *1).
N.L. Industries and Petersen courts specifically refer to the trustee's lack of "control"
over the trust in explaining the rationale behind the holdings.
133. Id. at 605.
134. Id.
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trustee's liability is limited to the extent that the trust assets are suffi-
cient to indemnify him. Thus, when the trustee had no power over the
decisions which resulted in the contamination of the property, her lia-
bility is limited to the assets held in trust. 3 '
Finally, where a trustee has the power to control the use of trust
property, and knowingly allowed the property to be used for the dis-
posal of hazardous substances, then the trustee is liable under section
107(a)(2) to the same extent that she would be liable if she held the
property free of trust. This rule holds the trustee personally liable,
beyond the assets held in trust, because the trustee chose to permit the
contamnnation of the property. 136
The first rule relates to the liability of the trustee as a current owner
who was not the owner at the time of disposal of hazardous sub-
stances. The second and third rules relate to the liability of current
and past owners who were the owners at the time of disposal.137
Trustees who come within the definitions set forth in the second and
third rules will be held personally liable.
The court's decision raises several concerns. For example, the court
presupposes that in 1966, VNB "knew" that the substances deposited
m the landfill were "hazardous." What did the court mean by "know-
ingly?" It cites no evidence that VNB knew that the substances in the
landfill were hazardous or that VNB was cognizant of the possible
ramifications. Perhaps the court meant that regardless of whether a
trustee knew the substances were hazardous, the mere fact that the
trustee's decision consequently gave rise to contaminated property
and clean-up costs is enough to hold the trustee personally liable.
Such ambiguity leaves room for various interpretations. For example,
some future court may interpret knowingly as requiring a showing
that the trustee possessed actual knowledge, while another may only
require a showing that the trustee possessed mere constructive
knowledge.
Seemingly as a justification for its holding, the court asserted that its
general rules are "consistent with the stated position of the environ-
mental rule on lender liability."' 38 In 1992, EPA issued its "Final
Rule"' 39 on lender liability which significantly reduced the circum-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id; see also Sound Foundation, supra note 46, at 66. Amicus curiae Graham
and Lindquist suggest that the court formulated the first two general rules in reliance
on RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 265, and are sound statements of the applicable
law. General rule 3, on the other hand, is premised on RESTATEMENT, supra note 29,
§ 264. Graham and Lindquist reject this rule because the "court mistakenly looked to
§ 264 as the currently operative rule of decision in most states, and thus adopted the
wrong approach in its third rule." Sound Foundation, supra note 46, at 66.
138. Phoenix HI, 827 F Supp. at 606.
139. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,349 (to be codified in 40 CFR 300). EPA expressed
this view in the Summary as follows:
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stances under which a lender can be held liable under CERCLA. The
Final Rule does not exempt trustees from liability under CERCLA.
The preamble to the Final Rule, however, discusses why trustees are
not specifically excluded, but does not advocate holding trustees per-
sonally liable.
Furthermore, the Arizona court emphasized EPA's reference to
"innocent" trustees in its Final Rule. The Arizona court construed
"innocent" as meaning those trustees "that would have no way of
knowing whether the trust's property was contaminated, nor would
they have been able to have prevented the contamination."'4n It is
important to note that EPA did not define the term "innocent"; rather
the court gave it a meaning. The court seems to have disregarded
EPA's emphasis that courts should rely on "the applicable laws gov-
ermng trustee and fiduciary liability."'' The applicable laws, when
interpreted in light of the developing trend in trust law, would relieve
a trustee from personal liability.
IV. LEGISLATIVE ACrION
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have proposed
legislation which would provide fiduciaries some protection from
CERCLA. Currently, four bills are in various committees, three of
which specifically address fiduciary liability under CERCLA. 141
On June 17, 1993, Senator D'Amato introduced the Depository In-
stitutions Regulatory Improvements Act of 199313 ("D'Amato Bill")
which seeks "to enhance credit availability by streamlining Federal
regulations applicable to financial institutions."'144 The bill is designed
to remove and lighten regulatory burdens on lending institutions by
including environmental provisions which limit CERCLA lender lia-
bility for those who hold property in a fiduciary capacity.145
The proposed rule did not address trustees because neither the section
101(20)(A) security interest exemption nor any other section of CERCLA
makes any special provision for trustees. However, with one important ex-
ception, EPA agrees with most of the commentators' general statements re-
garding the circumstances under which trusts and trustees are responsible
for costs incurred under CERCLA to address hazardous substance contami-
nation, because they are generally accurate statements of the applicable laws
govermng trustee and fiduciary liability: "innocent" trustees or fiduciaries
are not liable under CERCLA.
140. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 606.
141. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,349.
142. A fourth bill is H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., introduced by Rep. Swift
offers scant relief to "owners" and "operators" under CERCLA.
143. S. 1124, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
144. See S. 1124, synopsis (1993).
145. S. 1124, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 201 (e)(3); See Theodore C. Taub, Pre-Trans-
action and Transactional Issues Involving Hazardous Materials/Waste, C851 ALI-ABA
251, 329 (1993).
1994]
480 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. V
The D'Amato bill also provides a "safe harbor" provision which re-
lieves a trustee, inter alia, of CERCLA liability when such liability is
based solely on the fact that the trustee "ha[d] the unexercised capac-
ity to influence operations at or on property m which it has a security
interest."'1 46 This provision would protect those trustees who possess
the typical trustee powers but who do not actually manage the prop-
erty operations. 147
Two other bills introduced are still in the House of Representatives.
Representative La Falce introduced H.R. 2462 (La Falce bill) on June
18, 1993148 and Representative Cox introduced H.R. 2718 (Cox bill)
on July 26, 1993.149 Like the D'Amato bill, the La Falce and Cox bills
both seek to limit potential CERCLA liability of trustees and other
fiduciaries. The La Falce bill seeks to relieve a trustee from liability
when she is not at fault for the property contamination. Further, it
attempts to narrow liability to of those who participate m the "actual"
management instead of holding a fiduciary liable for merely having
the "capacity to influence" the property operations.'
The Cox bill proposes to remove a trustee from the "owner" and
"operator" definition under CERCLA but does not protect one who
places property m trust m order to shield herself from CERCLA lia-
bility. 15 ' Moreover, the Cox bill offers additional comfort to the
trustee community by providing that a trustee liable under CERCLA
is liable only in her representative capacity. Accordingly, a trustee




The Phoenix I and Phoenix II decisions present a double entendre.
Although the courts' approach to the issue of trustee liability under
CERCLA is strained and, m some respects, erroneous, it did establish
a good framework for analysis by basing its decision m part on trust
law. The court did lament the fact that CERCLA "casts too wide a
net," perhaps indicating that it felt compelled to hold the trustee
liable. 53
146. S. 1124, § 201(b); Taub, supra note 145, at 329. "Security interest" includes a
"deed of trust." See S. 1124, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., § 201 (e)(8).
147. It is important to note that the D'Amato bill is careful not to define trustee
liability too broadly. For example, if a trustees "cause" or "significantly and maten-
ally" contribute to the release of hazardous substances they are responsible for clean-
up. See S. 1124 § 201(c).
148. H.R. 2462, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
149. H.R. 2718, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
150. H.R. 2462 § 2(5).
151. H.R. 2718 § 1(a)(2)(F)(3).
152. H.R. 2718 § 1(a)(2)(F)(ll).
153. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 605.
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On the one hand, by formulating a uniform federal rule of decision
based on trust law, the decisions provide future courts with a solid
framework for analysis.' 4 On the other hand, the court mistakenly
looked to Restatement section 264 as the currently operative rule of
decision in most states and completely disregarded UPC section 7-306
which explicitly resolves trustees of liability absent fault. 15 This is a
significant oversight because the court, without any explanation, com-
pletely disregarded the rule in most states, enabling environmental
plaintiffs to reach trustees' personal assets.
It is impossible to predict how future courts will decide the trustee
liability issue. It is certain, however, that they will experience great
difficulty, mainly because it is unclear what Congress intended by m-
cluding "owner" as a PRP under CERCLA. If future courts decide to
interpret "owner" by its plain meaning, trustees will have to be found
liable as an owner. This is so because CERCLA does not differentiate
between legal and equitable owners. Nor is there legislative history to
guide the courts.
It is unlikely, however, that future courts will hold "owners" liable
based solely on ownership, regardless of other factors, since they have
been reluctant to do so m the past. For example, in cases involving
shareholder liability under CERCLA, courts have refrained from
holding a shareholder liable based solely on its ownership of the cor-
poration. 5 6 Rather, shareholders have been held liable as "opera-
tors" in situations where they controlled and directed the hazardous
activity. 157 Moreover, in Phoenix I and Phoenix I, the Arizona court
made a painstaking effort to hold the trustee liable for reasons other
than mere legal ownership. 158
As explained, a trust is a unique form of ownership since legal title
to property is divorced from equitable title. The trustee derives none
of the benefits of a "typical" property owner.'5 9 Simply put, a
trustee's ownership is different and should be treated differently. The
question which must inexorably follow is, how?
Since the beneficiary is the beneficial owner of the property, it is the
beneficiary who benefits from the ownership. It follows, therefore,
that the beneficiary should be deemed the "true" owner of the prop-
erty. If, however, Congress intended that ownership must be accom-
panied by other factors, then a court may consider a beneficiary's lack
of control over the disposition or use of the property before taking
154. See Sound Foundation, supra note 46, at 66.
155. The UPC supersedes RESTATEmNT, supra note 29, § 264, which was last up-
dated in 1957.
156. NEPACCO, supra note 19, at 743-44; United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., Inc.,
910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990).
157. Id.
158. Phoenix II, 827 F Supp. at 604.
159. The trustee derives no benefit from the trust property as long as the trustee is
not also the beneficiary.
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title and refuse to hold a beneficiary liable under CERCLA.16 ° Be-
cause of the unique ownership of trusts, however, neither a trustee or
a beneficiary fit comfortably into the "owner pigeonhole." '' Conse-
quently, a court may choose to resolve this conflict by holding both
the trustee and beneficiary liable. 62
Moreover, a future court may choose not to follow the Arizona
court's decision. Instead, trustees' liability may be limited to the as-
sets held in trust. Since contamnated property may be valueless, no
funds may be available. 163 Troubling, however, is that "such a limita-
tion on liability would create a powerful incentive for covered persons
to place contaminated property in trust, in order to shield themselves
form liability."'" Therefore, it would be imperative that a court in-
vestigate the purposes behind a party's creation of a trust.
Should a future court follow the lead of the Arizona court, a differ-
ent standard could be employed that would protect past trustees who
could not have "known," at the time decisions were made, the future
ramifications of those decisions. If a future court chooses to follow
the Arizona court's lead by adopting traditional trust law instead of
the growing statutory law, a more difficult burden of "knowing"
should be employed, at least with respect to trustees who made deci-
sions predating CERCLA.
For example, before a trustee is held personally liable beyond the
extent of the trust assets, there should be a showing that the trustee
acted "with wanton and reckless disregard" for the consequences. As
for prospective trustees, the Arizona court's "knowingly" standard
must be clarified and an actual knowledge requirement should be im-
plemented instead of merely requiring constructive knowledge. It is
desirable to employ skilled trustees to deal with the complex issues
present in the environmental realm. Accordingly, there should be
concern among the legal community that such skilled people not be
alienated by a dracoman regulation scheme. 65
Alternatively, Congress could amend CERCLA to exclude inno-
cent trustees from personal liability In fashioning a definition for "in-
nocent," Congress could incorporate a "knowing" standard such as
the one suggested above. While the bills currently in the House and
Senate offer some relief and protection to trustees, they do not offer
enough protection. Although it is inadvisable to offer blanket fiduci-
ary protection, trustees without fault should not be held personally
liable.
160. George Pendygraft et al., Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent De-




163. Id. at 138.
164. Id.
165. See generally Better Brite, 483 N.W.2d at 583.
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It remains to be seen exactly how successful the trustee community
will be m exerting pressure on EPA and Congress to make amend-
ments to protect trustee personal assets. Until then, trustees can con-
sider themselves on the membership list of the non-exclusive
CERCLA club!
Tracy Spencer Walsh

